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COI\NISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COI\NUNITIES 
SEC(93)  ·1551  f Ina I 
Brussels,  14  October  1993 
REPORT  FROM  THE  COMMISSION 
ON  THE  COMMUNITY  ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR  THE  IMPORTATION  OF 
FISHERY .·PRODUCTS INTRODUCTION 
At  its meeting  on  24  and  25  June  1993,  the Council  diecussed.the situation 
on the market  for  fishery  products  and  cams to the following  conclusion: 
"Finally,  it  considered  that  the  current  situation  required  the 
effectiveness of existing market  management  and  safeguard mechanisms  to be 
analysed.  This  analysis should cover both  fishery problems  and the problems 
of  the processing  industry.  To  this end,  it asked  the  Commission to submit 
by  15  October  a  comprehensive  report  accompanied  by  appropriate  proposals 
to  ensure  in  trade  with  third  countries,  while  honouring  international 
commitments,  strict  compliance  with  the  fundamental  objectives  of  the 
common  fisheries  policy,  in  accordance  with  Article  39  of  the  Treaty,, 
including the principle of  Community·preference  and  the  competitiveness of 
the processing industry." 
This report is in answer to the Council's request. 
On  29  June,  the  Commission  asked  the  Member  States  to  provide  a  list  of 
points  requiring  priority treatment  and  to give their views  on  the  idea of 
unbinding  certain  presentations  of  products  which  had  been  put  forward  at 
the Council of fisheries ministers  on  24June. 
The  concerns  and  suggestions  of  the  Member  States  may  be.  suminarized  a·s 
follows: 
1.  several  Member  States went  beyond  the fall  in  demand  to stress the 
structural  nature of  the crisis on the market  (over-fished  stocks, 
illegal  fishing,  over-capacity  in  the  fishing  fleet)  and  changes 
affecting the  fishing  industry in the Community  (growth of trade on 
a·  world  scale,  growing  imports  of  frozen  white  fish  replaci[\g 
species traditionally caught in Community waters,  lower air freight 
costs,  competition between  foodstuffs). 
2.  A  number  of  Member  States  wondered  what  the  economic  impact  of 
Regulations  (EEC)  Nos  420/93  (minimum  prices)  and  695/93  (measures 
applicable  to  direct  landings  from  third  countries)  had  been  in 
terms of  consumption,  the cost of supply to the processing industry 
and the restoration of market balance. 
3.  Two  opposing  views  emerged  on  the  subject  of  Community  preference. 
Some  wished  to  strengthen  its  application,  principally  by 
reconsidering  certain  international  agreements  between  the 
Community  and  non-member  countries  or  through  stronger  protective 
measures  (higher  minimum  import  prices,  reform  of  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  3191/82  and  the method  of  calculating reference  prices,  partial 
rethinking  of  a  policy  of  self-sufficiency  regarded  as  too 
generous,  permanent  arrangements  for  direct  landings)  while  others_ 
favoured  continuation  of  the  existing  supply  policy  with .  no 
measures  belng·adopted which would risk blocking  Community  imports~ 
rapportEN/bj  ·  1  ·. One  Member  State  suggested  both  a  reduction  in  customs  dutiea  on 
raw  materials  and  higher  reference  prices  for  semi-finished  and 
finished products  in order to ensure fair conditions of competition 
between  the  processing  industry  in  the  Community  and  industries 
elsewhere. 
4.  A  large majority of the Member  States: 
were  opposed  to  any  move  to  unbind  CCT  duties  on  fresh 
products; 
supported  campaigns  to  promote  the  consumption  of  fishery 
products. 
5.  Two  Member  States  stressed the  seriousness of  the situation  in the 
sardine sector  (production  and processing). 
6.  In  connection  with  stronger  internal  market  management  measures, 
one  Member  State  suggested  ensuring  fairer  competition  within  the 
Community  by  extending the rules governing producers'  organizations 
to  the  most  sensitive  products  and  reassessing  the  amount  of 
carryover aid. 
Another  Member  State  suggested  translating  thoughts.  on  quality 
policy  into  action  and  harmonizing  sales descriptions  at  Community 
level. 
* 
*  * 
* 
The  Commission  working  paper  on  the  State  of  the  Market  in  Fishery 
Products,*  considered  by  the  Council  on  24  June,  contained  a  number  of 
points  in  response.  Reference  should  be  made  to  that  document,  to  which 
this report  may  be  considered complementary. 
That  Commission  working  paper  noted  that  the  arrangements  for  the 
importation  of  fishery  products  were  the  result  of  the  tariff  policy 
pursued  by  the  Community  with  its international  partners  over  a  period  of 
more  than thirty years  (principle of  consolidation).  That  consolidation of 
the  CCT  for  fishery products limited the Community's  scope  for manoeuvre  in 
adopting market  management  mechanisms,  whether  internally or externally. 
The  market  organization  mechanisms,  which  form  part  of  a  market  economy 
system,  are  intended  to  stabilize markets  in  a  situation of  international 
competition without  guaranteeing prices  which  will  ensure  a  profit  for  the 
sector.  That  choice  was  made  by  the  Community  when  the  common  fisheries 
policy was  inaugurated. 
When  expressed  through  the  consolidated  CCT,  application  of  the  principle 
of  Community  preference  in  the  fisheries  sector  has  a  more  limited  impact 
than  that  of  the  CAP  (no  import  levies,  no  quantitative  restrictions,  no 
prices unrelated to those on world markets). 
*  SEC(93)  948  of  17  June  1993. 
rapportEN/bj  - f..  -The  Commission  had  explained  how  the  principle  of  Community  preference 
applies  to  the  market  organization  in  its  1991  report  to  the  Council  and· 
the  European  Parliament  on  the  common  fisheries  policy  (SEC(9l)  2288  final 
of  4  December  1991). 
In that report  (para.  2.3.4.2.)  it stressed that the main  component'of this 
element  of  the  market  organization  is  the  Common  Customs  Tariff  but  also 
noted that "International trade is moving  towards  the dismantling of tariff 
prot-ection,  in the  fishery  sector  and  outside.  This  needs  to  be  considered 
in  the  discussions  of  the  future  development  of  international  competition 
conditions  in which the Community  fleets will be working." 
This  principle  is  also  subject  to  other  constraints  imposed  by  the 
exceptions to the CCT,  in particular existing preferential arrangements. 
This  report  therefore  considers  the  tariff  situation  as  it  reflects  the 
state of Community  preference. 
It also  looks  at the  trade  mechanisms  designed  to  implement  this principle 
in the  circumstances of  a  market  in crisis. 
Finally,  it describes  certain health protection  and  customs  measures  which 
· help  to  maintain  a  balance  between  Community  production  and  imports  from 
non~member countries. 
* 
*  * 
* 
l-
rapportEN/bj  ·J A.  TARIFFS 
1~  The  bound tariff 
A  statistical  analysis  of  tariff  headings  gives  an  idea,  albeit  a 
simplified  one,  ·of  the  tariff  situation  of  fisheries  products.  This 
analysis takes  no  account  of the trade  flows  for  each heading. 
Chapter  Definition  Number  of  <  15%  ~  15% 
headings 
3  Fresh,  frozen,  salted  283  124  159 
or  smoked  products 
5  Waste  unsuitable  2  2  0 
for  consumption 
16  Processed products  36  4  32 
19  Edible pasta ·containing fish  1  0  1 
23  Flours  l  1  0 
Total  323  131  192 
This  table  demonstrates  that  the  bulk  of  tariff  headings  in  the  fisheries 
sector  are  subject  to duties  of  15%  or  more.  This  is particularly true  of 
Chapter  16,  processed  products  (prepared or preserved),  where  most  tariffs 
lie between  20%  and  25%. 
The  Council  of  fisheries  ministers  on  24  June  considered  the  partial 
unbinding  of  tariffs,  particularly  those  on  fresh  products,  which  are 
particularly  sensitive  on  the  Community  market.  No  formal  request  was 
subsequently  made.  In  any  case,  the  Commission  does  not  consider  that 
action on this idea would  be  appropriate at present. 
Any  _unbinding  in  GATT  entails  difficult  and  lengthy  procedures.  Binding 
gives  non-member  countries rights  and  unbinding requires  compensation. 
Quite  apart  from  legal  and  technical  considerations,  since  unbinding  does 
not  affect  existing  preferential  arrangements  it is  not  certain  that  its 
impact  on  the  fisheries  sector  would  be  helpful.  As  the  EFTA  countries 
already  account  for  25%  of  imports  of  fish  into  the  Community  and  imports 
from  these  countries,  particularly.  of  fresh  products,  which  are  the  most 
sensitive on  the  Community market,  will  increase with the conclusion of the 
EEA,  it is  clear  that  the  unbinding  of  these  products  in  GATT  will  have 
only  a  limited effect. 
Except  in cases  of  manifest  fraud,*  no  action  can  be  taken  on  preferential 
agreements  with  the  ACP  countries  (Lome  convention)  and  the  generalized 
system of preferences  for  developing countries. 
*  GSP  94:  because  of  frauds  by  certain  ASEAN  countries,  the 
Commission  intends  to  suspend  the benefits of tariff reductions  on 
tinned tuna in 1994  (CCT:  25%- GSP  93:  18%;  CN  code  1604  14  90). 
rapportEN/bj  - J/  · 
----------- -----. So  that  the  Council  can  assess  the  impact  of  exceptions  to  the  Common 
Customs  Tariff,  whether  made  as  a  result  of  the  Community's  international 
commitments  or as  a  result of  independent decisions,  each concession by the 
Community  must  be·  evaluated.  These  i~clude  many  whose  scope  goes  well 
beyond  the  common  fisheries  policy  and  which  are  concerned  with  the  more 
general  objectives  of  Community  policy,  such  as  general  commercial  policy 
or  development  aid,  but  which  also  cover  fishery  products  to  a  certain 
extent.  Details of these exceptions are annexed. 
2.  Tariff exceptions 
Tariff reductions  for  fish  and  fishery products will generally appear  as: 
tariff quotas,  equal  to  limited quantities at  a  reduced  duty 
rate,  or 
tariff  suspensions,  equal  to  unlimited  quantities  at  a 
reduced  duty  rate  (partial  suspension)  or  exempt  from  duty 
(total suspension). 
Such  reductions  can  be  and  have  been  granted  under  three  different  legal 
frameworks: 
- GATT  concessions 
- other conventional concessions 
- autonomous  reductions. 
Annexed to the report is a  table showing all the Community's tariff schemes 
for  fish  and  fishery  products  with  details  of  their  characteristics  and 
estimated value.  Reference  is also  made  to  TARIC  (Integrated tariff of the 
European  Communities),  published  in Official  Journal  No  C  143  A  of  24  May 
1993.  The  estimate ·of  duty  receipts  is  primarily. based  on  1991  COMEXT  -
import  figures,  and  calculated on  a  maximalistic basis  (Annex  1). 
In  1991  the  Community  imported  3  582  122  tonnes  of  fishery  products with  a 
total  value  of  ECU  7.55  billion.  Of  this  total  62'  was  imported  partially 
or  totally  exempt  from  CCT  duties.  This  means  that  2  220  916  tonnes  of 
fishery  products  (worth· ECU  4.68  billion).  benefited  from  reductions  in 
customs duties under  GATT,  as conventional or  autonomous  concessions. 
1.  GATT  concessions 
The  GATT  tariff concessions  stem  from  the community's  legal undertakings  in 
the  framework  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  often  as  a 
consequence  of  the. successive  enlargements  of  the  Community.  The  legal 
basis  is  Article il3  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community. 
The  GATT  concessions  are all tariff quotas.  . 
The  EC  is obliged to open these quotas  annually. 
2.  Other conventional  concessions 
2.1  Lome  IV  convention 
The  Lome  IV  Convention  entered  into  force  1990.  The  participants  are  the 
community  and the more  than  70  ACP  countries  (African,  Caribbean,  Pacific) • 
rapportEN/bj  .  ~· The  Community  grants  the  ACP  countries  a  total  tariff  suspension  for  all 
fishery  products.  Also  covered  by  the  total  suspension  are  the  OCTs 
(Overseas  Countries  and  Territories).  Although  the  tariffication  is  the 
same  for  the  ACP  countries  and  the  least-developed  GSP  countries  (and  many 
countrie.s fall  into both categories),  the provisions in the  Lorn~ Convention 
are  more  beneficial,  due  to  a  more  liberal  set  of  rules  of  origin 
(including Community/ACP/OCT  cumulation).  · 
2.2 Traditional bilateral agreements 
The  "bilateral"  tariff  concessions  have  their  legal  basis  partly  in 
Article 113  of  the  Treaty  and  partly  in  the  individual  trade  agreements 
between  the  Community  and  the partner countries  in question.  The  Community 
has  concluded  a  number  of  such  agreements,  where  fish  and  fishery  products 
are  among  the  goods  for  which  the  it  grants  tariff  concessions  to  the 
partner country or countries. 
rapportEN/bj 
2.2.1  Norway 
The  concessions  stem  from  the  Agreement  between  the  Community  and 
Norway,  signed on  14 May  1973,  and  a  subsequent  Exchange of Letters 
concerning agriculture and  fisheries,  signed on  14  July 1986. 
The  preferences  granted  to  Norway  are  subject  to  respect  for  the 
reference prices. 
The  tariff  reductions  centre  mainly  on  salted  and  dried  cod 
products and  frozen fillets of salt-water fish. 
2.2.2  Sweden 
Th~  concessions  stem  from  the  agreement  between  the  Community  and 
Sweden,  signed  on  22  July  1972,  and  a  subsequent  Exchange  of 
Letters  concerning  agriculture  and  fisheries,  signed  on 
15  September  1986. 
The  preferences  granted  to  Sweden  are  subject  to  respect  for  the 
reference prices. 
2.2.3  Iceland 
The  concessions  stem  from  Article  1  of  Protocol  No  6 
Agreement  between  the  community  and  Iceland,  signed  on 
1972. 
of  the 
22  July 
Article 2  of that Protocol  links the granting of tariff concessions 
and  a  satisfactory solution to unspecified  problems  concerning  the 
Icelandic management  of  fishing rights. 
Up  to  now  Article  2  has  not  been  implemented.  The  Community  has  not 
received any  counterparts for its granting of concessions. 
The  preferences  granted  to  Iceland  are  subject  to  respect  for 
reference prices,  and  they  are all  in the  form  of partial or total 
tariff suspensions. 
.  "-2.2.4  Switzerland 
The  concessions  stem  frem  the  agreement  between  the  Community  and 
switzerland,  signed  on  22  July  1972,  and  a  subsequent  Exchange  of 
Letters  concerning  agriculture  and  fisheries,  signed  on  14 July 
1986. 
The  Community  has  granted  total  duty  suspension  for  certain 
unspecified freshwater  fish,  fresh or frozen.  Mar·ginal  importance.· 
2.2.5  The  Faroe  Islands 
The  concessions  stem  from  the  agreement  between  the  Community  and 
Denmark/the  Faroe  Islands,  signed on  2  December  1991. 
The  preferences granted to the Faroe  Islands are subject to respect 
for the reference prices. 
The  main  principle  is  that  nearly  all  fishery  products  of 
·commercial  interest  to  the  Faroe  Islands  can  enter  the  Community 
duty free subject to. certain annual quantitative limitations on the 
most  sensitive products.  These  limitations might  take the  form of: 
rapportEN/bj 
tariff quotas  (most  sensitive products) 
tariff  ceilings  {duty  exemption  for  a  specific  quantity  -
when  the  import  ceiling has  been  reached,  the Community might 
reinstate  the  normal  duty  rate.  This  reinstatement  is, 
however,  not  automatic  but  will  be  applied  only  in  severe 
market  situations) 
statistical  survey  (duty-free  import  of  unlimited  quantities 
with  a  possibility for  the. Community  to apply the normal  duty 
in 'cases of market disturbances).  ' 
This  import  regime  has  only  been  in  force  from  1  January 
1992.  No  duties  were  reinstated  for  the  products  covered  by 
the  tariff  ceilings.  The  quotas  for  trout  and  salmon  were 
exhausted  and  the  quota  for  shrimps  might  have  been  fully 
used  as  well,.  if  Faroese ·administrative· problems  had  not 
occurred. 
2.2.6  Greenland 
A  fisheries  agreement  between  the  Community  and  Denmark/Greenland 
was  concluded  in  1985.  The  present  Protocol  fixing  the  conditions 
under  which  the  community  vessels  may  operate  in  the  Greenland 
waters  as well  as  the counterparts granted by  the Community  expires 
on  31  December  1994. 
Under  the  1985  Protocol  all  fishery  products  of  Greenland  origin 
may  be  exported  free  of  duty  to  the  Community  provided  that  the 
Community  has  satisfactory access to Greenland waters. 
Preferential  imports  from  Greenland  are  not  conditional  on  strict 
respect  for the reference price. rapportEN/bj 
2.2.7  ex  CSFR 
Following  the  Europe  Agreement  between  the  Community  and  the  CSFR 
(the  Interim  agreement  was  signed  on  16  December  1992),  the 
Community  has unilaterally granted  a  limited number of total tariff 
suspensions of marginal  economic  importance. 
The  Europe  Agreement  provides  for  discussions  to  take  place  on 
possible future reciprocal tariff concessions. 
2.2.8  Romania 
Following  the  Interim  agreement  between  the  Community  and  Romania; 
signed on  1  February  1993,  the two parties have granted each other 
a  number  of reciprocal tariff reductions. 
The · tariff  suspensions  granted  by  the  Community  fall  in  two 
categories: 
rollover  of  concessions  similar  to  the  GSP  system  (when  the 
Interim  Agreement  entered  into  force,  Romania  was 
automatically excluded  from the GSP  preferences) 
some  products  for  which  the consolidated  Community  duty  rate 
was  reduced  by 10\. 
The  present value of these concessions is considered marginal. 
2.2.9  Turkey 
Under  the  Association  Agreement  between  the  Community  and  Turkey 
all fishery products of Turkish origin can enter the Community  free 
of duty. 
Turkey  will  enter  into 
then  apply the  CCT  vis-
origin  rules  already 
A  customs  union  between  the  Community  and 
force  from  1  January 1995.  Turkey will  from 
a-vis  third  countries,  as  well  as  the 
practised  by  the  Community.  As  a  result,  an 
products  manufactured  in  Turkey,  especially 
enter the Community market. 
2.2.10  Maghreb 
increased  quantity  of 
canned  products,  will 
Under  the  Cooperation  Agreements  between  the  Community  and  the 
Maghreb  countries  (Morocco,  Algeria,  Tunisia),  all fishery products 
from  these  countries  can enter the  Community  free  of  duty  with the 
exception of prepared  and  preserved sardines  (canned sardines),  for 
which the following  import  schemes exist: 
Tunisia:  annual tariff quota  (100  tonnes at 0\) 
Morocco  tariff  suspension  at  8%  during  1993,  gradually 
being  reduced  to  5%  for  the  period  from  1  January  1994  to 
30  April  1996  (provision  annexed  to  the  Community/Morocco 
fisheries  agreement,  but essentially based on  the Cooperation 
Agreement ) • 
. '8  .. 2.2.11  Egypt 
The  Community  has granted partial tariff suspensions to Egypt  (from 
20\  to  10\)  for  prepared/preserved  shrimps  of  marginal  economic. 
importance. 
3.  Autonomous  reductions 
The  autonomous tariff reductions  can mainly  be  divided into two  categories: 
reductions  based  on  the  Community's  GSP  system  (Generalized  System 
of  Preferences) 
reductions  stemming  from actual market  needs. 
3.1  GSP 
The  legal  basis  is  Article 113  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community.  The  GSP  system  is renewed  annually  and  covers  trade  in 
certain  products  with  the  developing  countries.  The  system  is  autonomous 
and  one-sided:  the  Community  grants  tariff  reductions .to  these  countries 
without receiving any similar counterparts. 
3 .1.1  Traditional GSP 
In the traditional  (or conventional)  GSP  scheme,  tariff reductions  (partial 
tariff  suspensions)  are  granted  for  a  limited  number  of  fishery  products, · 




livers and  roes  in all presentations,and 
all crustaceans  and  molluscs with the exception of Crangon  shrimps, 
Norway  lobster and  Illex spp. 
all  prepared/preserved  products  with  the  exception  of  tuna, 
anchovies,  sardines and Crangon  shrimps. 
The  duty reductions vary  from  product to product,  but it can safely be. said 
that  the  GSP  duty  rates  are  around  33\  - 50\  of  th~  conventional  duty 
rates. 
Russia  and  the  other  former  Soviet  republics  do  not  benefit  from  the 
fishery part of  the traditional GSP  scheme.  Any  future tariff reductions to 
these countries might  be negotiated in the  framework of  a  fishery  agreement 
or on  a  reciprocal basis. 
3 .1.2  GSP  (least-developed countries) 
All  imports  of  fishery  products  from  the  least-developed  countries  might 
enter  the  Community  free  of  duty.  The  economic  importance  of  this 
concession  is,  however,  rather  limited,  partly because  the majority  of  the 
least-developed  countries  already  benefit  from  the  Lome  Convention  and 
partly  because  these  countries.  have  very  limited  commercial  fishing 
activities. 
rapportEN/bj  . 1. 3.1.3  "GSP  Drogue"  (related to the fight against drugs) 
Four  of  the  five  Andean  Pact  countriae  (Columbia,  Ecuador,  Peru. and 
Bolivia)  are  treated  exactly  like  the  least-developed  countries  all 
imports are exempt  from duties. 
This  special  arrangement  is  a  temporary  one  - it will  end  in  the  autumn 
1994,  if not  prolonged politically.  The  trade concessions  have  been granted 
as  economic  and  political  assistance  to  these  countries  in  an  attempt  to 
dev.elop  their  economies  away  from  the  drug-related  sectors.  This  scheme 
unfortunately  has  negative  effects  on  the  Community's  other  trading 
partners in the region. 
3 .l.  4  GSP  (Central  America) 
A  system  similar  to  the  "GSP  Drogue"  has  been  introduced  for  the  Central 
American countries:  total suspension of duties for all fishery products. 
Again,  this  GSP  scheme  has  been  introduced  for  reasons  which  have  nothing 
specific  to  do  with  the  fisheries  sector  (promoting  the  harmonious 
development  and  diversification  of  their  economies).  The  scheme  will  be 
stopped in autumn  1994,  if not prolonged politically. 
Panama  does  not  benefit  from  the  special  preferences  in  the  fisheries 
sector. 
3.2  Market orientated tariff concessions 
3.2.1  Tuna 
In  order to  secure sufficient  raw  material  for  the  Community  production of 
canned  tuna,  a  total  tariff  suspension  for  tuna  and  Euthynnus  has  been 
instituted. 
Following  the  decision  of  the  Council  of  19  October  1992,  the  Commission 
will,  before  30  June  1994,  present  a  report  on  the  market  situation  for 
tuna,  together with appropriate proposals. 
3.3.2  Other  autonomous  reductions 
The  Community  might  decide  to  grant  autonomous  tariff  reductions  (tariff 
quotas  or suspensions)  as  a  result of  supply deficit situations.  The  legal 
basis  here  is Article 28  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community. 
Such  autonomous  reductions can briefly be characterized by: 
limited and  temporary nature 
gr~nted on  an  erga  omnes  basis 
specific end-use. 
The  erga  omnes  principle  simply  means  that  the  tariff  schemes  are  opened 
for  all  possible  suppliers,  irrespective  of  nationality,  subject  to  any 
fixed limitations of quantity. 
The  specific end-use  clause  should  guarantee that  the  imported  products  do 
not  go  directly  for  human  consumption  but  are  instead destined  for  one  or 
more  acts  of  processing  (either  for  the  production  of  very  specific  goods 
or  generally  as  raw  material  to  the  processing  sector).  In  this  way  the 
rapportEN/bj principle of  community  preference  is  safeguarded.  As  the market  conditions 
(and  thereby  the  supply  situation)  change  from  one  fishing  season  to 
another,  the  scope  (product  range,  quantities,  duty  reductions)  of  the 
tariff  concessions  are  not  identical  year  after  year.  Nevertheless,  a 
certain "generalization"  has  been  introduc'ltd  in the· community's  autonomous 
tariff policy: 
the  products  are  meant  for  the  Community  processing  industry  (see 
above) 
a  certain number  of the  same  products benefit nearly each year  from 
the  tariff  concessions,  due  to  insufficient  Community  production, 
namely 
whitefish  (cod,  coalfish,  halibut,  (haddock)),  whole, 
fresh/frozen 
frozen fillets of hake  and Alaska pollack 
shrimps  (pandalus borealis)  and eels 
salted/dried products of cod and coalfish 
the concessions  are normally granted  from 
1  January  for  hake  and  Alaska  pollack  fillets  (no  Community 
.Production) 
· 1  April  for  the  other  products,  mainly  in  order  to  protect 
Community  fishermen  and  consequently  safeguard  the  principle 
of  Community  preference 
autonomous·  preferential  imports  are  subject  to  respect  for  the 
reference prices 
the reduced tariffs are chosen to weigh  more  lightly on  primary raw 
materials  (whole  fish)  than  on  semi-processed  products.  The  level 
of  the  duty  reductions  must  obviously  respect  the  Community's 
international engagements. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  some  of  these  international  undertakings 
(primarily  the  tariff  preferences  granted  to  certain  EFTA  States)  have 
brought  the  tariff  level  for  semi-processed  products  (fillets)  below  the 
tariff  level  for  whole  fish  (raw  material  for  the  Community  fillet 
production).  The  autonomous  tariff policy  does,  to certain degree,  rectify 
the situation.  · 
The  autonomous  quotas  and  suspensions  (the  latter  only  used  for  products 
with  no  or  limited  Community  production)  are  published  in  Regulations 
Nos  3412/92,  3413/92  and  1272/93.  One  of  these  suspensions  - dogfish, 
fresh/frozen  at  6\  - is in reality replacing  a  Community  obligation vis-a-
vis GATT  to open  an  annual  quota  (5  000 tonnes at 6\). 
4.  Tariff policy in·the near  future 
4.1  EEA 
In the framework of the EEA  (European  Economic  Area)  the Parties involved  -
the  Community  and  the  EFTA  countries  with  the  exception  of  Switzerland  -
have  agreed on  numerous  reciprocal tariff concessions  for  fishery products. 
on  the  part  of  the  Community,  the  fishery  products  have  been  divided  into 
three groups: 
rapport  EN/b) 
sensitive  products  (salmon,  herring,  mackerel,  shrimps,  Norway 
lobster,  coquilles  st·Jacques)  for  which  no  tariff concessions  are 
granted 
·-11 total  duty  suspension  for  cod,  haddock,  saithe  and  halibut  (whole 
fresh/frozen  and  fresh  f~llets), all salted/dried cod products with 
the  exception  of  salted  and  dried  cod,  "other"  fillets  in 
salted/dried presentations or coated,  and caviar substitutes 
partial and  gra~ual tariff suspension  for all other products. 
The  partial  suspension  was  planned  to  start  on  1  January  1993  with  a  14% 
reduction  in  the  basic  duty  to  be  followed  by  four  further  reductions  of 
14%  each  during  the  following  four  years.  After  this  initial  five-year 
period,  the. community's  basic duty  on  the majority of  the  fishery products 
vis-a-vis  its  EEA  partners  would  have  been  reduced  to  only  30%  of  its . 
present level. 
The  entry  into  force  of  the  EEA  has,  however,  been  delayed  as  a  result  of 
the  Swiss  referendum  in December  1992.  Several  of  the  Community's  Member 
states  have  not  yet  ratified the  Agreement  and  the  earliest  date  for  its 
entry into force  is now  considered to be  1  December  1993. 
A  number  of elements  in the EEA  should be underlined: 
the  EFTA  countries are not taking over the acquis  communautaire but 
will instead adjust their national legislation to the principles of 
the  acquis  communautaire  in  order  to  eliminate  any  distortion  of 
competition; 
preferential  imports  under  the  EEA  will  not  be  subject  to  strict 
respect  for  reference  prices  in  reality  the  principle  of 
Community  preference will  be extended to an  (albeit partly limited) 
"EEA  - preference"; 
the existing preferential  agreements  between  the  Community  and  the 
individual  EFTA  countries will continue if and  when these offer the 
EFTA  countries more  favourable  conditions than the EEA; 
the  EEA  agreement  includes  a  review and  development  clause; 
the principle of  cumulation  formms  part of  the  EEA  rules of origin; 
nearly all the products  for  which the Community  offers total tariff 
suspension  are  those  which  normally  would  benefit  from  the  annual 
autonomous tariff concessions. 
It is difficult to  put  exact  figures  on  the tariff concessions  granted  by 
the  Community,  but  previous estimates  showed  a  duty  value of  around  ECU  48 
million. 
4.2  Autonomous  concessions 
Following  the entry  into  force  of  the  EEA,  the  need  for  future  autonomous 
reductions will  be greatly reduced due to the EEA  product  coverage. 
However,  the  Community  processing  industry  may  still  need  certain  limited 
tariff  reductions  as  certain  raw  material  will  not  be  supplied  by  any  of 
the  EEA  partners  (or  not  supplied  in sufficient quantities).  The  future  of 
the  autonomous  concessions  must  obviously  be  examined  in  the  light  of  the 
availability of substitute products  (as  an example:  will tariff suspensions 
for  Alaska  pollack  be  needed  if  the  supply  of  traditional  whitefish  has 
greatly increased?). 
4.3  Argentina 
A  fisheries  agreement  with  Argentina  has  been  negotiated  and  the  Council 
will adopt that agreement  towards  the end of  1993. 
rapportEN/bj Annexed  to this agreement  are  a  number  of tariff suspensions  to be  granted 
.,,  by  the Community  on  an erga crones  basis  : 
hake  (hubsi),  frozen  ~hole and fillets- 5\ 
hake fillets,  coated  - 10\ 
anchovies,  salted  5\ 
different regional whitefish species  5\ 
Frozen  fillets  of  hake  are  already  included  in  an  autonomous  suspension 
(hake  fillets  (Merluccius  spp  with  a  few  exceptions)  at  10\).  Imports  of 
frozen  hubsi  fillets  will  therefore,  after· Council  adoption,  take  place 
under another  (but  more  favourable)  preferential  scheme.  It is difficult to 
estimate  the  value  of  these  tariff  concessions,  partly  because  a 
considerable  number  of  the  tariff  reductions  concern  species  presently 
unknown,  or little known,  to Community processors and  consumers.  The tariff 
suspensions  will  obviously  mainly  benefit  products  coming  from  the 
Argentine fishery sector  (due to product selection/coverage). 
4.4  Uruguay  Round 
The  Uruguay  Round  has  been  relaunched  following  the  outcome  of  the  G7 
meeting  in  Japan  this  summer.  Basic  agreement  was  reached  on  models  for 
tariff reductions which  include fishery products.  This  agreement  takes  into 
account the principle of  sensitive products. 
At  the  time  this report  was  prepared,  the  outcome  of  the  Uruguay  Round  as 
regards the  fishery sector could not  be  predicted. 
B.  SAFEGUARD  MEASURES 
1.  HORIZONTAL  MEASURES 
Fishery  products  are  subject  to the  general  Community  rules  on  imports  of 
goods  into its territory.  Under  these rules,  the horizontal  mechanisms  for 
harmonizing the conditions of competition with respect to  imported products 
also apply to fishery  products. 
Hence,  in December  1989  Community  salmon  farmers  brought  an  anti-dumping 
complaint before the Commission with regard to Norwegian practices. 
After  the  inquiry,  the  Commission  found  a  dumping  margin  of  11.3\  to  the 
det.riment  of  Community  producers. 
However,  with  the  exception  of  one  salmon-producing  Member  State,  all the 
other . Member  States  rejected  the  levying  of  an  11. 3\  anti-:dumping  duty 
proposed  by  the  Commission,  whereupon  the  Commission ·  terminated  its 
inquiry"'. 
The  Commission  takes  the  view  that  the  levying  of  an  anti-dumping  duty  is 
one  of  the  most  effective  ,ways  of  protecting  the  market  against  unfair 
trade. 
*  OJ  No  L  69,  16.3.1991,  p.  32  and  OJ  No  L  75,  21.3.1991,  p.  64. 
rapportEN/bl  ·  1;3 · 2.  MEASURES  UNDER  THE  MARKET  ORGANIZATION 
As  a  result  of  the  binding  within  GATT  of  the  Common  Customs  Tariff  for 
fishery  products,  the  general  import  arrangements  for  these  products  are 
subject  to  the  principle  of  liberalization.  This  principle  prohibits  all 
quantitative  restrictions  on  imports  and  measures  having  an  equivalent 
effect,  with  the  exception  of  measures  adopted  within  the  framework  of 
safeguard mechanisms  which  comply with the specific GATT  rules provided  for 
this  purpose.  The  market  organization  provides  for  two  mechanisms  of  this 
type: 
reference  prices  (Articles  22  and  23  of  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  3795/92) 
emergency  measures 
No  3795/92) 
(Article 24  of  Regulation  (EEC) 
1.  Reference  prices 
rapportEN/bj 
In  normal  conditions,  the  system  of  reference  prices  for  the 
products  concerned  is  a  form  of  permanent  surveillance  of  the 
import  market  for  these  products,  particularly  with  regard  to 
prices.  The  system  was  explicitly  notified  to  the  GATT  when  the 
market  organization  for  fishery  products  was  set  up  and  complies 
with the consolidation requirements  in so  far  as: 
it imposes  no.  a  priori minimum  import prices, 
the  reference  prices  are  derived  from  the  intervention 
prices,  which  are  themselves  fixed  in  such  a  way  that  the 
concessions granted  by  binding are not  brought  into question. 
The  system is designed to serve as  a  safeguard mechanism  (targeting 
prices only)  when  two  circumstances coincide: 
the  free-at-frontier price of  a  given product  imported  from  a 
third country is lower than the reference price, 
large quantities of the product are being  imported. 
The  purpose  of  the  measures  which  can  be  taken  in  such 
circumstances  is to subject  imports  to  a  minimum  price by  imposing 
compliance  with  the  reference  price,  by  levying  a  countervailing 
charge on  such  imports or by abolishing an  autonomous  suspension of 
customs duties previously in force. 
However,  such  measures  may  be  adopted  only if they  comply  with the 
conditions  laid  down  in  Article XI  of  the  GATT,  because  they  are 
considered  to  be  measures  having  an  effect  equivalent  to  a 
quantitative  restriction.  Article XI  lays  down  the  principle  of 
eliminating  such  restrictions  between  the  Contracting  Parties  and 
authorizes  them  only  in  the  specific  exceptional  circumstances 
detailed in paragraph 2(c): 
Restrictions  are  permitted  if  they- are  "necessary  to  the 
enforcement  of  governmental  measures  whic~ operate to restrict the 
quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or 
produced  •••  or to  remove  a  temporary  surplus  of  the  like domestic 
product •..  ". Article XI  also stipulates that such restrictions must  not  have the 
effect  of  reducing  "the total  of  imports  relative to the total  of 
domestic  production  as  compared  with  the  proportion  which  might 
reas'onably  be  expected  to  rule  between  the  two  in  the  absence  of 
restrictions"~ 
Therefore,  to  comply  with  the  conditions  laid  down  in  Article XI, 
the  mechanisms  provided  for  under  the  system  of  reference  prices 
can  be  applied if there is an  increase  in the  volume  of  imports of 
a  given  product  when  there  are. measures  in  force  to  restrict  the 
domestic  supply of that product. 
In practice,  this requirement  means  that the crisis situation must 
result  in  substantial  increases  in  withdrawals  from  the  Community 
market. 
In  addition,  it  should  be  noted  that  GATT  panels  have  interpreted 
Article XI(2) (c)  very  strictly;  to  date  no  ·Contracting  Party  has 
successfully  invoked  this  clause  in  its  defence.  The  Community  would 
therefore  be  ill-advised  to  place  too  many  hopes  in  the  possibility  of 
recourse to this Article. 
2.  Emergency measures 
rapportEH/bj 
Article  24  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  3759/92  provides that appropriate 
measures may  be applied  in trade with third countries if the market 
in  the  products  referred  to  in  Article  1  experiences  or  is 
threatened  with  serious  disturbances  which  may  endanger .  the 
objectives  of  Article  39  of  the  Treaty  and  which  are  caused  by 
imports  or exports. 
At  first  sight,  this  Article appears  to  have  a  wide  scope  for 
application  as  regards  both  the  minimum  conditions  for  triggering 
emergency  measures  ("threat of disturbances which  may  endanger ••• ") 
and the measures  which  can be taken  ("appropriate measures"). 
In practice,  implementation of Article 24  is much  more  delicate and 
complex  because  it falls  directly  within  the  scope  of  Article XIX 
of GATT. 
Article  XIX  authorizes  recourse  by  a  contracting  party  to  an 
emergency  measure  in  circumstances  similar  to  those  defined  in 
Article  24  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3759/92  (import  of  a  product  in 
such  increased quantities  and  under  such  conditions  as to  cause or 
threaten serious  injury to domestic  producers of  like products  ••• ) 
but  specifies that  the  increase  in  imports  must  be  attributable to 
the effect of  the obligations  incurred  by  the Contracting  Party  in 
question under the Agreement. In  addition,  a  Contracting  Party  may  suspend  its  obligation  in 
whole  or  in part  in the  above-mentioned  circumstances  only  once it 
has  engaged  in  consultation  with  the  other  Contracting  Parties 
concerned  (consultation prior to or  immediately after the taking of 
emergency  measures)  after  which,  if  no  agreement  is  reached,  the 
affected Contracting Parties are free to suspend the application of 
concessions or equivalent obligations in trade with the Contracting 
Party which took the emergency measures. 
Any  decision to  implement Article 24  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  3759/92 
must therefore be  based ·on  an analysis  from three angles: 
economic:  precise  identification  of  the  nature,  causes, 
extent and  consequences of the market  disturbance; 
legal:  the  conclusions  of  the  economic  analysis  must 
demonstrate  compliance  with  the  conditions  laid  down  in 
Article 24  of  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3759/92  and  in Article XIX 
of the GATT; 
political:  the  expected  effect  of  an  emergency  measure  must 
be  weighed  against  the  concessions  to  be  granted  to  other 
Contracting Parties or the risk of retaliatory measures  if no 
agreement  is reached. 
If  a  Member  State  intending  to  take  steps  to  implement  Article 24 ( 1)  of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  3759/92  requests  further  details  of  possible  measures 
and  wishes  to  know  which  instruments  can be  used to defend  the market  from 
serious  disturbance,  the  Commission  would  point  out  that  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  288/82*  already  meets  these  objectives.  There  is  therefore  no  need  to 
add to the existing Community  legal  instruments. 
Lastly,  many  agreements  concluded  by  the  Community  with  third  countries 
(EFTA,  the  Faroes,  etc.)  contain  special  provisions  in  the  event  of  a 
crisis on the Community market.  The effect of these provisions is generally 
to  restrict  the  margin  of  autonomy  in  the  Community's  decision-making 
process,  in that  the  agreements  provide  for  consultation  procedures  prior 
to any  autonomous  decision being taken by the Community. 
3.  EFFECTS  OF  THE  MARKET  ORGANIZATION  MEASURES  ON  THE  COMMUNITY  MARKET 
Regulations  (EEC)  No  420/93  and  695/93  were  adopted within the  framework  of 
the  regulatory  mechanism  described  at point 8.2.  They  have  not  resulted  in 
any  appreciable  increases  in  auction  prices  but,  by  permitting  the 
elimination  from  the  market  of  quantities  of  products  imported  at 
abnormally  low  prices,  have  helped  stabilize  prices  on  the  Community 
market.  These  mechanisms  are able to meet  short-term market  crises but  are 
not  designed  to  counter  a  structural  crisis,  which  in  any  case  does  not 
affect the fisheries sector alone. 
Moreover,  since  these  mechanisms  are  by  nature  exceptional  and  temporary, 
their real  impact  on  the volume  of  imports  and  on  consumption  levels cannot 
be  measured.  With  regard to  consumption,  it is generally accepted that  low 
demand  is  largely  the  result  of  the  economic  stagnation  being  experienced 
by  the Community.  In this context,  the attractiveness  of  the selling price 
of  fish is an essential  component  in stimulating consumption. 
The  recent market crisis has cast  a  spotlight on  two  current trends. 
*  OJ  No  L  35,  9.2.1982,  p.  1. 
rapport EN/bj  . -"f' . First of all,  new  structural  factors  have  emerged  to  contribute to  a  drop 
in  the  price  of  fish.  Among  these  are  the  increasing  competition  from 
developing  countries  wishing  to  exploit  their  own  resources  (this 
competition  has  been  facilitated  by  the  drop  in  transport  costs),  the 
reformed  CAP  which  is  designed  to  reduce  farm  prices  on  the  Community 
market,  competition  from  aquaculture  products  for  which  a  number  of  third 
countries  have  low-cost  labour  and  production  conditions  which  are  often 
more  favourable  than  those  in the  Community,  and  the  growing  influence  of 
large-scale  distribution  in  the  marketing  of  fishery  products,  which 
implies  that  certain  distribution  channels  for  fishery  products  are 
)Jecoming  more  developed.  Producer  organizations  must  re-examine  their role 
in these different changes. 
Secondly,  the  drop  in  first-level  sale  prices  has  not  been  reflected  in 
retail prices and  has  not therefore contributed to stimulating consumption, 
which  could have  helped the market to recover. 
It  is  possible  to  call  into  question  the  organization  of  sales,  and 
particularly  the  control  exerted  by  producers  over  the  price  formation 
process  downstream  from  production.  The  existing  legal  instruments, 
particularly the market  organization rules,  which  result  from  applying  the 
general  principles  enshrined  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome  with  regard  to  the 
organization  of  competition,  match  the  objectives  which  have  been  set. 
However,  within  this  legal  framework,  the  organization  of  marketing 
channels  is the prerogative of  private initiative; it is therefore  not  the 
Community's  place to intervene  in this  area,  except  in the  case of cartels 
or abuse of a  dominant position. 
4.  Market  organization and  supply measures 
It should  be  noted  that the  principle  of  security  of  supplies  referred  to 
in  the  Treaty  concerns  products  of  Community  origin  and  not  market  supply 
by  imported products.* 
This principle does  not mean  that the Community  may  not  also seek to ensure 
that  its· consumers  and  processors  are  able  to  benefit  from  competitive 
supply conditions. 
The  viability  of  the  production  sector  depends  on  the  competitiveness  of 
the  Community  processing  industry  which  is  the  main  outlet  for  the  raw 
material  fished.  Since  Community  supply is inadequate to meet  market  needs, 
it is essential to ensure further supplies to the processing sector through 
imports under competitive conditions. 
This  means  that  management  of  the market  organization  for  fishery  products 
must  take  account  of  the  specific  needs  of  the  processing  sector  by 
providing  regular  supplies  whose  price,  quality  and  the  choice  offered 
support  international  competition  and  offer  the  consumer  the  products 
required. 
It is  first  of  all  the  conditions  of  supply  of  the  raw  material  and  then 
the  conditions  for  processing  that  raw  material  into  finished  products 
which  determine  the  competitiveness  of  the  community  processing  industry 
and  hence its access toboth the domestic  and the world markets. 
*  See  1991  Report  on  the  common  fisheries  policy,  SEC(91)  2288  final 
of  4  December  1991,  p.  36. 
rapportEN/bj  ·  ~~ · In the tuna  sector,  where  the  interdependence of production  and  processing 
has hitherto always  been regarded as an essential feature,  the principle of 
market  supply at  a  zero rate of duty  has  been  incorporated into the market 
organization regulation  (Council Regulation  (EEC)  No  3759/92  of  17  December 
1992). 
(a)  Supply 
The  consequences  of  the  over-exploitation  of  certain  fishing  grounds,  and 
particularly  of  certain  demersal  species,  by  Community  vessels  include  a 
reduction  in the  number  of  species  and  smaller quantities  available to the 
processing sector,  causing  increased prices. 
Since it was  unable  to procure  the quantities  of  raw  material  it required 
to meet  demand  for processed products,  the industry had to  look outside the 
Community  for  regular supplies and  is now  heavily dependent  on  them. 
Besides  "traditional"  supplies  (Community  production  and  imports), 
aquaculture  now  accounts  for  a  growing  proportion  of  supplies  to  the 
processing  industry,  particularly of certain species  such as salmonids. 
Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  Community  operators  involved  in  joint 
ventures  set  up  with  the  aid  of  Community  finance  are  required  to  give 
priority to supplying the Community market. 
These  are  the  factors  which  currently  exert  considerable  influence  on 
access to raw materials. 
(b)  Processing 
The  competitiveness of this sector depends  not only on  securing supplies on 
terms as close as possible to those on  the  international market but also on 
its own  intrinsic competitiveness_. 
A  major  element  of  relevance  here  is the  high  cost  of  labour  in  Europe  as 
compared with certain developing countries. 
The  fact  that  investments  in processing  industries,  particularly  in Africa 
and  south-east  Asia,  have  often  been  made  in  proximity  to  fish  stocks 
clearly illustrates this problem. 
The  fishing  industry  is  highly  international  in  nature,  capital  is mobile 
and  the  technology  required  is  comparatively  easily  accessible  to 
developing countries. 
These  factors  have  encouraged the migration  of  whole  segments  of  the world 
processing industry. 
For  some  blue  fish,  this  relocation  process  has  resulted  in  a  gradual 
decline  in the hitherto dominant  position of  the  Community  industry  on  its 
home  market  and  increased competition on export markets. 
The  aim  of  Community  rules  should  be  to facilitate  commercial  trade  which 
will  supply  processing  factories  on  commercially  profitable terms,  that is 
with  the  lowest  possible customs  duties  on  raw  materials  and  due  attention 
to production constraints arising  from  the extractive sector. 
r~pportEN/bj  ·1B  · As  noted  in  the  1991  report  (para.  8.2.2.4,  p.  80),  it is  not  enough  to 
reduce  tariffs  on  raw  materials.  This  policy  should  be  accompanied  by 
structural measures to modernize the sector and  so  improve its performance. 
The  policy  adopted  for  the  fisheries  processing  industry  should  not  be 
based solely on the objectives of the  common  fisheries policy as set out  in 
Article 39  of  the  Treaty  but  should  also  follow  the  general  approach  to 
industrial  policy  advocated  by  the  Commission.  In  a  system  of  open  and 
competitive  markets,  that  approach  seeks.  to  encourage  initiative  and  the 
development  of  firms,  particularly small  firms,  in the Community. 
C.  MONITORING  AND  CONTROLS 
In  line with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  Member  States  are  responsible 
for  monitoring  application  of  the  Community  rules,  in  particular  with 
regard  to  provenance,  marketing  standards,  reference  prices  and  health 
matters. 
1.  Community  health  rules  and  arrangements  for  trade  in  fishery 
products 
Health is one of the main  factors  in the terms  and conditions governing the 
importation of  fishery  products.  The  health  arrangements  are based  on  the 
principle  of  non-discrimination  in  accordance  with  international 
undertakings  given  by  the Community,  so  health cannot  be  used  as  a  measure 
of  equivalent  effect  to  an  import  restriction.  Equally,  the  arrangements 
must  be  seen  to  be  applied  fully  if  they  are  not  to  constitute  reverse 
discriminatio·n.  This  implies  adequate  monitoring  resources  both  at 
Community  and at Member  State level. 
A  brief  summary  of  Community  legislation  in the  field is given  in Annex  2; 
it will help to underline its significance. 
A  detailed  desc,ription of  this  vast . area  of  legislation  would  be  out  of 
place in this report.  The  reader is reminded of  the following: 
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the  general  principle  of  equivalent  treatment  for  the  production 
and  placing  on  the  market  of  Community  products  and  imported 
products; 
Directives  91/492/EEC  and  91/493/EEC  lay  down  a  series  of 
obligations  for· the  production  and  placing  on  the  market  of  live 
bivalve molluscs  and  fishery products; 
the  above  Directives  also  lay  down  the  procedures  to  be  followed 
for  assessing whether the  hygiene conditions under which  production 
is.- carried  out  in· a  non-Community ..  country  can  be  considered  as 
equivalent or not. 
-~-A  Commission  Decision  adopted  after  the  Standing  Veterinary  Committee  has 
delivered  its  opinion  sets  the  specific  conditions  for  imports  into  the 
Community  from  each  country;  this  is  based  on  the  report  of  a  mission  of 
experts  from  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States.  The  conditions  must 
include: 
health certification for  products exported to the Community; 
a  list of approved establishments and  factory vessels in accordance 
with the requirements  laid down  in the Directives  and  forwarded  to 
the Commission by the recognized competent  authority; 
marking of packagings,  in particular with the approval  number  given 
to  the  production  establishment  or  factory  vessel  from  which  the 
products originate. 
This  system therefore implies the recognition of the competent  authority in 
the third country  and  delegation to that authority of  the  power  to  approve 
the  establishments  and  factory  vessels  on  the  basis  of  requirements 
equivalent  to  those  set  out  in  the  Directive.  Where  recognition  of  a 
competent  authority proves  impossible Directive 91/493/EEC provides  for  the 
possibility of  direct  approval  of  an  establishment  or  factory  vessel  from 
the  third  country  by  Commission  inspectors.  Such  a  possibility  does  not 
exist in Directive  91/492/EEC  for  live bivalve molluscs. 
Recognition of  a  competent  authority can  be called  into question if routine 
inspections  by  Commission  experts  indicate  that  the  guarantees  are  no 
longer being provided or if controls of  imported products  show that they  do 
not  comply with established health standards. 
Given  the  large  number  of  countries  importing  fishery  products  into  the 
community  there  needs  to  be  a  sufficiently  long  period  for  the  Commission 
to  adopt  decisions  fixing  the· specific  importation  conditions  for  each 
third  country.  For  this  reason  Directives  91/492/EEC  and  91/493/EEC 
specify  that  pending  the  fixing  of  specific  importation  conditions  Member 
States  must  ensure  that  conditions  are  applied  which  are  at  least 
equivalent  to those  governing  the  production  and  placing  on  the  market  of 
Community  products.  In  other  words,  this  provision  obliges  Member  States 
to  require  third  countries  to  provide  the  require~  health  guarantees, 
provide  a  list of  establishments  approved  for  exports  to the  Community  and 
produce  an  official  health  certificate.  To  avoid  duplication  of  health 
certificates  from  one  Member  State to the  next  the Commission  has  prepared 
a  single model  for  a  provisional  health certificate  (Decision  93/185/EEC*) 
on  the  basis  of  Article 16  of  Directive  91/493/EEC  which  enables 
transitional  measures  to  be  adopted  for  a  period  expiring  on  31  December 
1994.  The  certificate,  which  includes  identification  of  the  exporter 
country's  competent  authority  and  the  approval  number  of  the  production 
establishment,  has  been  compulsory  for  all  fishery  product  imports  since 
1  July 1993. 
*  OJ  No  L  79,  1.4.1993,  p.  80. 
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the  subject  of  a  specific  decision  concerning  the  import  of  fishery 
products:  Argentina,  Chile,  Canada  and  the  Faroe  Islands,  and  only  one, 
Morocco,  has  been  subject  to  the  same  process  in  respect  of  live  bivalve 
molluscs.  Until  the  European  Economic  Area  agreement  enters  into  force, 
countries  such  as  Norway  and  Iceland  which  export  large  quantities  of 
fishery  products  to  the  Community  have  to  be  treated  as  third  countries. 
However,  the  agreement  is  due  to  enter  into  force  very.  soon  so  the 
Commisslon  has  agreed not to send  inspection missions to those countries. 
In conclusion,  Community  health legislation can be  regarded as  adequate  for 
the following  purposes: 
(1)  ensuring that  fishery  and  aquaculture products  imported  from  third 
countries  are  of  a  health  quality  equivalent  to  that  of  .Community 
products; 
(2)  ensuring  that  the  level  of  controls  in  third  countries  and 
therefore  expenditure  on  them  is  equivalent  to  those  of  Community 
countries; 
(3)  ensuring  that  production  conditions  in  third  countries,  linked  to 
structural  and  operating  conditions,  are  equivalent  to  those  in 
Community  countries,  thus restricting distortion of competition; 
{4)  ensuring  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  legislation,  both 
on-the-spot  in  third  countries'  production  establishments  and  at 
the point of  entry of the products  into the Community. 
However,  given that the EEC  is the largest  importer  in the world of  fishery 
products,  ECU  7.2 billion in  1992  from  over  120 third countries,  the proper 
application  of  the  legislation  entails  a  considerable  effort  both  for 
Member  States,  whose  competent  authorities  have  to  inspect  such quantities 
of  imports,  and  for  the  Commission,  whose  Veterinary  and  Phytosanitary 
Inspection  Office  has. to  check  production,  inspection  and  health  control 
conditions  in a  very large number  of  non-Community  countries. 
At· present, . the  lack  of. funds  available to this  newly  created Off  ice means 
that the Commission  cannot  yet fulfil its responsibilities in this field. 
2.  Fraud in the fishery products sector 
over  the past  few  years  a  large  number  of  irregularities  involving  fishery 
product  imports,  mainly  under  the  various  preferential  arrangements  (ACP, 
certain EFTA  countries,  GSPs,  etc.),  have  been  looked  into by Member  States 
with  coordination  by  DG  XXI,  which  has  in  some  cases  organised  Community 
investigations in the countries concerned. 
It is clear that,  quite apart  from the  impact  on  Community  resources,  these 
frauds  and  irregularities  also  disturb  the  market  and  distort  the 
stati~tics needed to manage  the market  properly. 
rapportEN/bj It  can  be  seen  from  the  list of  cases  in the  period  1990-93  and  from  the 
annual  reports  on  combating  fraud  for  1991  and  1992  that these were  mainly 
problems  associated  with  applying  preferential  tariff  arrangements,  but 
there  were  also  false  descriptions  of  products  (for the  purpose  either of 
obtaining  a  financial  advantage  or  of  avoiding  a  quota),  undervaluing  of 
products  or  price  manipulations  (minimum  and  reference  prices)  and  public 
health problems  (cf.  Annex  3). 
With  two  exceptions,  the  irregularities  concerning  preferential 
arrangements  involved  the  use  of  raw  materials  imported  from  countries 
other  than  the  country  benefiting  from  the  preference  (or  exceeding  the 
combined  totals  allowed  from  the  ACP  countries,  the  overseas  departments 
and  territories,  etc.)  and/or  non-compliance  with  the  rules  relating  to 
ownership  or  crewing  of  vessels,  or  again  (ACP)  the  use  of  third-country 
vessels  chartered  without  prior  consent.  In  the  case  of  certain  GSP 
countries there was  also  (intentional)  confusion between territorial waters 
(12  miles)  and  the  exclusive  economic  zone  (200  miles)  of  the  country  in 
question.  While  the  factors  enabling  a  conclusion  to  be  drawn  on  the 
status  of  products  (origin  of  imported  raw  materials,  location  of  vessels 
and catch zones)  may  be  known  or available to the country issuing the EUR.l 
certificate or  Form  A,  this is not  the case  for  the  customs  authorities  in 
the  Member  States,  who  have  virtually  no  opportunity to  check this at the 
time of  import. 
Another  fraud  mechanism  concerning  preferential  arrangements  but  also  the 
avoidance  of  quotas  is  the  false  description  of  products,  for  example 
canned  tuna/bonito.  This  problem  should  be  solved  from  1  July  1993  with 
the  introduction  of  health  certificates  containing  the  scientific 
designation of  the  fish  species,  a  particularly useful  item of  information 
given  that  identificati'on  by  customs  officials  is  often  only  possible  by 
means  of  scientific  analysis  and  even  this  kind  of  analysis  cannot  always 
distinguish certain species  (canned tuna/bonito). 
Customs  officers  encounter  quite  significant  problems  when  checking 
measures  based  on  prices,  particularly the  system  for  converting  reference 
prices into minimum  import prices,  it being relatively easy for  an operator 
to  evade  the  minimum-price  rules  by  reporting  fictitious  or  even  real 
commissions  which  have  the effect of  increasing the  invoiced price  so that 
it is higher  than  the  minimum  price to  be  complied  with.  However,  such  a 
situation cannot be  counted as  fraud if such  commissions  are actually paid. 
A  fictitious  commission  cannot  be  revealed until after  a  thorough  audit of 
the accounts of  the  importing companies,  and  because of the legal  system  in 
several  Member  States  such  an  audit  involves  special  authorisation  and/or 
formal  application to the  judiciary. 
Apart  from  these  difficulties,  the  conditions  under  which  the  rules  are 
applied  may  vary  from  one  Member  State to another  and  so  may  give rise to 
distortions of trade. 
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The  Commission  working  paper  on  the  situation  on  the  market  in  fishery 
products  put  forward  a  number  possible  solutions,  some  of  which  are 
currently being  implemented. 
1.  With  regard  to  imports  in  the  form  of  direct  landings,  the 
Commission  has  transmitted  to  the  Council  a  proposal  for  a 
Regulation*  to  provide  the  community  with  a  permanent  legal 
instrument  intended  to  even  up  competition  conditions  between  the 
Community  fleet and direct  landings by third-country vessels. 
2.  With  regard to reporting  under  the  common  market  organization,  the 
Commission  has  just  improved  the  existing  rules**  to  simplify  for 
Member  States  the  content  of  information  indispensable  for ·market 
monitoring purposes. 
3. 
To  improve  this  tool  Member  States  must  collaborate  with  the 
Commission's  departments  so  as 
communications  media,  thereby 
market  data. 
to  make  more  use  of  the  latest 
speeding  up  the  transmission  of 
In ·the  opinion  of  the  Commission  the  reporting  required  by  the 
common  market  organisation rules  is broadly  adequate,  provided the 
rules  are  fully  complied  with,  to  ensure  proper  monitoring  of  the 
market;  it  therefore  seems  unnecessary  to  introduce  new  means  of 
monitoring  such as  an  economic  observatory. 
With  regard  to  improving  the  reference  price  system,  more 
particularly  the  risk  of  fraud  as  a  result  of  artificial  price 
increases  on  imported  products  designed  to  evade  the  relevant 
rules,  the  .commission  intends.  to · present  a  proposal  to  .amend. 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  3191/S2. 
With  regard to the extension  requested  by  certain Member  States to 
the  list of  products  to  be  subject  to  the  reference  price  system, 
the  Commision  is  to  study  these  requests;  this.  study  is  made  more 
difficult  by· the  absence  of  separated tariff  headings  for  several 
products. 
4.  Economic  measures 
Besides the provisions proposed  and  adopted  by the Commission under 
the  common  market organisation,  the Commission  has  envisaged acting 
to cushion the consequences of the crisis by  introducing: 
a  compensatory allowance for price declines:  Member  States have  not 
shown  much  interest in this measure. 
a  Community-wide campaign to promote fish:  this would  take the  form 
of several generic promotion  campaigns  created for different groups 
of  species. 
*  COM(93)  343  final of  20 July 1993. 
**  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2210/93  of  26  July 1993,  OJ  No  L  197,  6.8.1993, 
p.  8. 
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The  Commission  believes  that  although  the  drastic  fall  in  prices 
has  been  accentuated  by  a  number  of  cyclical  factors  it  is 
nevertheless the result of  fundamental  structural problems. 
The  fact that it has affected both demersal  and pelagic species has 
stimulated a  wider analysis of the reasons  for the crisis. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  general  economic  problems  in  the  European 
Community  and  its  opening  to  the  outside  have  stopped  Community 
fishermen  from  offsetting  lost  income  resulting  from  smaller  fish 
stocks  by  increasing prices,  whereas  such  prices  regularly rose  in 
previous years. 
It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  crisis  really  is  structural  and 
that  the  entire  industry  is  facing  a  competitiveness  problem  the 
gravity of which  varies  from  one  Member  State to the next. 
The  Commission  believes  that  the  reasons  for  this  are  mainly  the 
over-exploitation  of  fish  stocks  resulting  from  excess  fleet 
capacity and the costs faced  by  fishing businesses  and processors. 
Structural  measures  have  been  and  continue  to  be  introduced  to 
adjust  the  size  of  the  fleet  to  catch  capacities  and  thus  help 
gradually to eliminate excess  fishing capacity. 
This  approach,  the  strengthening  of  which  was  approved  by  Council 
and  Parliament  when  the  1991  Report  was  being  discussed,  is being 
implemented within the  framework of the Structural  Funds. 
To  support  this  a  new  financial  instrument,  the  financial 
instrument  for  fisheries  guidance  (FIFG),  is  to  be  set  up;  its 
funds  will  ensure  that  the  objectives  of  the  multiannual  guidance 
programmes  are  achieved  and  help  to  speed  up  the  achievement  of 
equilibrium between  fleet and  fish stocks. 
It will also  help with modernisation of  the  fleet,  the aquaculture 
sector  and  the  fishery  product  processing  and. marketing  sectors. 
The  high  cost  of  labour  in the Community  will  have  to be  offset by 
increased productivity if competition  from third countries is to be 
confronted successfully. 
Another  task  of  the  FIFG  will  be  to  help  develop  industrial 
strategies  stressing  innovation  and  the  quality  of  Community 
fishery products  and publicising those aspects to the consumer. 
Restructuring  the  fisheries  sector  will  not  be  possible  without 
socio-economic problems. 
. rt. ·  ... · 
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With  that  in  mind,  the  Commission  intends  to  help  the  sector  by 
introducing accompanying  measures of various  forms: 
. in  areas  dependent  on  fishing  as  identified  in Objectives 1, 
2  and  5 (b)  of  the  reform  of  the  Structural  Funds  (ERDF  and 
ESF),  socio-economic  measures  to  assist  businesses  and 
workers to retrain and diversify activities; 
under  Objective  4  (ESF},  measures  to  help  workers  adjust  to 
industrial change  and with a  view to anticipating the effects 
of  restructuring the  sector  and  promoting  the  transformation 
of  production  systems; 
lastly,  under  a  Community  initiative,  measures  particularly 
aimed at the Community  fishing  industry  and  coastal regions. ANNEX 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE CCT 
1.  GATT CONCESSIONS 
GAIT  I  Herring,  34.000 T  0%  15  %  16/6- 1.995  Normally  100%  utilized 
fresh/frozen  ..  14/2  during August 
GAIT  I Cod, dried,  125.000 T  I  o%  113 %  1111  - 14.293  Normally 100 % utilized 
salted or in brine  31/12  during March 
~  II  GAIT  1  Silverhake,  2.000 T  8%  15%  111- 260  Quota normally under-
~  fresh/frozen  31112  utilized 
GAIT  I Cod, frozen  10.000 T  8%  15  %  1/1  - 2.651  Quota underutilized, due to 
fillets  31112  more beneficial bilateral 
tariff arrangements 
GAIT  I Hake, frozen  I  5.000 T  110%  115 %  11/7- I 
438  I  Normally  100 % utilized-




. 2. OTHER CONVENTIONAL CONCESSIONS 
!  2.1. LOME IV 
ACP  All products  no limits  0% 
-COUNTRIES 
2.2. TRADITIONAL BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
Norway  Cod, dried,  3.900 T  0% 
unsalted 
Norway  Cod, fillets,  3.000 T  0% 
dried,  salted or 
in brine 
Norway  Certain  400 T  10% 
prepared/preser-
ved products 
Norway  Cod, dried and  13.250 T  0% 
salted 





- 111  - 117.550  Origin rules : cumulation 
31112  between EC, ACP and 
OCT is possible 
13  %  111  - 7.158  Normally 100 % utilized, 
31/12  raw material must be 
Norwegian 
20%  111  - 3.385  Normally not fully utilized, 
31112  raw material  must be 
Norwegian 
20%  111- 74  1604- Products, normally 
31112  not fully utilized 
13%  114- 9.291  Normally 100 % utilized, 
31112  raw material must be 
Norwegian  I 
13  %  114- 5.095  Normally 100 % utilized, 
I 
31112  raw material must be 
I 









1) Frozen f111ets 
of saltwaterfish 







coalfish,  fresh 




no limits  3% 
no limits  3% 
no limits  7,5% 
3.500 T  0% 
1.500 T  0% 
60T  0% 
20.000 T  0% 
12%- 111  - )  Tariff suspensions,of which 
15%  31112  (  n •  1 is far the most 
15  %  111  - )  important 
31112  ( 16.759 
) 
16  %  111  - ( 
31112  ) 
12%- 111  - 800  Normally 100 % utilized -
15%  31/12  mainly cod 
18  %  111  - 1.065  Normally well utilized 
31112 
30 %  111  - 145  Normally 100  % utilized 
31/12 
15%  15/8- 782  Normally 75  % - 90 % 
14/2  utilized - could be even 
more utilized, if opening 
date was earlier (the quota 
· concerns herring in the 

















fresh or frozen 
250T  0% 
200T  0% 
120 T  7,5% 
no limits  0% 
20%  111  - )  All three quotas are 
31112  (  normally 100 % utilized 
) 
20%  1/1 - ( 
31/12  )  543 
( 
) 
20%  111  - ( 
31112  ) 
8%  1/1 - 211  Tariff suspension  for 
31/12  freshwaterfish,  not 
specifically identified in the 
CN Iceland  Cod/haddock/  no limits  3,7%  12%- 1/1  - Tariff suspensions - the 
coal  fish,  15%  31/12  raw material must be of 
fresh/frozen  Icelandic origin 
Due to the sheer number of 
Iceland  Redfish,  no limits  2%  8%- 1/1  -
suspensions,  an individual 
break-down has not been 
fresh/frozen  15%  31/12  made, but it can be 
Iceland  Livers/roes,  no lilmits  0%  10%  111  - mentioned that the value is 
fresh/frozen/  31/12  estimated to (IN 000 Ecu)  : 
salted  .  8100-
cod/haddock/coalfish 
Iceland  Frozen fillets of  no limits  0%  15%  111- .  3600 - redfish 
saltwaterfish  31/12  . 42000 - frozen fillets 
Iceland  Pandalus  no limits  0%  12%  1/1  - .  13000 - prepared shrimps 
Borealis  31112 
~  Iceland  Fillets, coated  no limits  0%  15%- 1/1 
20%  31/12 
Iceland  prepared spats  no limits  10  %'  20%  1/1  -
and certain  31/12 
whitefish 
·Iceland  Caviar  no limits  0%  30%  1/1  -
substitutes  31112 
d:\rapport\tab93-<:d Iceland  Prepared/preser- no limits  0%  14%- 111-




Switzerland  Certain  no limits  0%  8%  111  - 85  Tariff suspension for 
freshwaterfish,  31112  freshwaterfish,  not 
fresh/frozen  specifically identified in the 
CN 
Faroe Island  Nearly all  no limits  0%  - . 111  - 32.409  Respect of the reference 
products of  31112  _  price is conditional, raw 
commercial  material must be. of Faroese 
importance to  origin. The tariff regime 
~ 
the Faroe Islands  vis-a-vis the Faroe Islands _ 
is based on a total tariff 
suspension with the 
exception of 
. trout/salmon, 
fresh/frozen/  prepared 
.prepared 
herring/mackerel/  shrimps 
and Norway lobster for 
which quotas are instituted 



















no limits  0%  -
no limits  0%  8% 
no limits  0%  10% 
no limit  - -
no limits  0%  -
--
111  - 36.932  Respect of the reference . 
31/12  price is not conditional 
111  - ) 
31/12  ( 




31112  ( 
- 111- 29  Parital tariff suspensions 
31/12  for products belonging to 
chapters 03  16 and 23. The. 
reductions are either equal 
to the GSP scheme or equal 
to a 10  % decrease of the 
consolidated rates. 
111  - 6.219  Raw material must be of 
31/12  Turkish origin w  c...., 
Maghfeb  All fishery 
products 
I  Egypt  Prepared/preser-
ved shrimps 
I 
Argentina  Hake (Hubsi), 
frozen whole and 
frozen fillets 
Argentina  Hake fillets, 
coated 
Argentina  Anchovies, 
salted 
Argentina  Various regional 
whitefish, whole 
and fillets 
3.  Autonomous reductions 
d :\rapport\tab93-cd 
no limits  0% 
no limits  10 % 
no limits  5% 
no limits  10% 
no limits  5% 
no limits  5% 
- 111  - 43.214  Two exceptions from the 
I  31112  total suspension  : 
. Morocco  :· canned 
sardines are reduced to 8% 
in 1993 
. Tunesia : canned sardines 
are limited to a quota 
(100 Tat 0  %) 
20%  111- 2 
31/12 
15%  ?  - The fisheries agreement 
between the EC and 
Argentina is not yet 
15%  ? 
adopted by the Council 
-
10%  ?  -
15%  ?  -~ 
-..t.. 




















Various products  no limits  33%-50% 
in 03, 1604 and  reduction of 
1605  consolidated 
rate 
All products  no limits  0% 
All products  no limits  0% 
All products  no limits  0% 
- 111- 129.500  Origin rule : cumulation 
31112  between EC and GSP 
countries not possible 
- 111  - p.m.  The value is impossible to 
31/12  estimate. The major part is 
already included in the 
value for  the ACP 
countries 
- 111  - 44.113  Present system will be 
31/12  terminated in the autuinn 
1994 
- 1/l - 11.213  Present system will be 


















Tuna  no limits  0% 
Eel  5.000 T  0% 
Cod,  30.000 T  6% 
fresh/frozen 
Pandalus  5.000 T  6% 
Borealis 
Alaska pollack,  2.000 T  8% 
fresh/frozen 
Hake,  4.000 T  8% 
fresh/frozen 
Surimi  2.500 T  6% 
22  %  111- 12.598  For the processing of 1604 
31112  products. The value 
(12.598) has already been 
reduced for imports under 
ACP/GSP'Drogue'  I 
Maghreb 
3%  117- 909  Nonnally 100 % utilized. 
I  30/6  Destined for processing 
12%- 114- - R.  3412/92 
15%  31112  The quota for cod was 
12%  114-
nearly fully utilized end of  - July. 
31112  I 
15%  114-
I  - I 
31112  I 
15%  1/4 - - I 
31112 
15%  114- -
31/12 ERGA  Cod,  27.500 T  3,7%  12%- 1/7- - R.  1272/93 
OMNES  fresh/frozen  15%  31112  The 1.  tranche of the cod 
I  quota was fully used end of 
ERGA  Coalfish,  17.500 T  3,7%  15%  1/7- - ·July. 
OMNES  fresh/frozen  31112 
ERGA  Cod, wetsalted  60.000 T  4%  13%  3115- -
OMNES  31112 
ERGA  Cod, dried, not  500 T  7%  13%  3115- -
OMNES  salted  31112 
ERGA  Cod fillets,  3.000 T  8%  16  %  3115- -
OMNES  salted  31112 
ERGA  Coalfish fillets,  2.000 T  10  %  16  %  3115- -
OMNES  salted  31112 
ERGA  Greenland  3.900 T  4%  8%  3115- -
~ 
OMNES  halibut,  31112 
fresh/frozen 
- .  ------ ----
d :\npport\tab93-cd ~ 
~ 
I 
ERGA  . ! 
OMNES 
d:\rapport\tab93-cd 








111- - R.  3413/92 
10 %  15%  31112 
5%  15  % 
0-6% 
-·  56.067  All products covered by 
R.3412/92, R.3413/92 and 
R. 1272/93 :· 
- destined for processing 
-respect of ref. price Annex  2 
The  basic legislation 
The  conditions  for  the production  and  placing on the market  of  fishery  and 
aquaculture products are subject to the provisions of  SJ>E!Cific,  "vertical", 
Directives and general,  "horizontal",  Directives. 
I.  The  specific  Directives  cover  aspects  dealing  with  public  health 
(consumer  protection)  and animal  health  (livestock protection). 
(1)  Public health: 
Council Directive  91/492/EEC of  15  July  1991  laying  down  the health 
conditions  for the production and  the placing on the market  of  live 
bivalve molluscs.1 
Council Directive 91/493/EEC of  22  July  1991  laying down  the health 
conditions  for  the  production  and  the  placing  on  the  market  of 
fishery products.2 
Council Directive 92/48/EEC of  16  June  1992  laying down  the minimum 
hygiene  rules  applicable  to  fishery  products  caught  on  board 
certain  vessels  in  accordance  with  Article 3(1)  of  Directive 
91/493/EEC.3 
(2)  Animal  health: 
Council  Directive  91/67/EEC  of  28  January  1991  concerning  the 
animal  health  conditions  governing  the  placing  on  the  market  of 
aquaculture animals  and  products.4 
Council  Directive  93/53/EEC  of  24  June  1993  introducing  minimum 
Community  measures  for the control of certain fish diseases.5 
II.  General  Directives  lay  down  the  principles  for  the  organisation  of 
veterinary  controls  for  both  products  and  live  animals  in  intra-Community 
trade or on  import  into the Community  from third countries. 






6  OJ  No 
rapportEN/b' 
Council  Directive  89/662/EEC  of  11  December  1989  concerning 
veterinary  checks  in  intra-community  trade  with  a  view  to  the 
completion of the internal market.6 
OJ  No  L  268,  24.9.1991,  P•  1. 
OJ  No  L  268,  24.9.1991,  P·  15. 
OJ  No  L  187,  7.7.1992,  p.  41. 
OJ  No  L  46,  19.2.1991,  p.  1. 
OJ  No  L  175,  19.7.1993,  P·  23. 
L  395,  30.12.1989,  P·  13. 
. 3f Council  Directive  90/675/EEC  of  10  December  1990  laying  down  the 
principles  governing  the  organization  of · veterinary  checks  on 
products entering the Community.  from third countrieis.7 




Council  Directive  90/425/EEC  of  26  June  1990  concerning  veterinary 
and  zootechnical  checks  applicable  in  intra-Community  trade  in 
certain live animals  and  products with  a  view to the  completion of 
the internal market.B 
Council  Directive  91/496/EEC  of  15 July  1991  laying  down  the 
principles  governing  the  organization  of  veterinary  checks  on 
animals  entering  the  Community  from  third  countries  and  amending 
Directives 89/662/EEC,  90/425/EEC  and  90/675/EEc.9 
OJ  No  L  373,  31.12.1990,  p.  l. 
OJ  No  L  224,  18.8.1990,  P•  29. 






Annex  3 
LIST  OF  MUTUAL-ASSISTANCE  CASES  INVOLVING  FISHERY  PRODUCTS 
False  EUR.1's  from  the  Gambia  and  Sierra Leone  for  crustaceans  and 
fish of various provenance  (Japan,  Korea,  China,  etc.). imported via 
Las  Palmas  under  cover  of  false  declarations  of  direct  transport 
(preferential  origin:  ACP;  own  resources  at  stake:  ECU  2  million); 
recovery  situation partially  known,  including  ECU  88  500  (cf.  1991 
Annual  Report,  p.  20). 
Prawns/cod  from  Greenland  (preferential  origin:  overseas  countries 
and territories;  own  resources at stake and  recovered:  ECU  750  000) 
(cf.  1991  Annual  Report,  p.  20);  prawns  from  the  Faroe  Islands 
(preferential  origin:  autonomous  scheme;  own  resources  at  stake: 
ECU  10.5  million)  (cf.  1991  Annual  Report,  p.  22);  recovery  in 
progress. 
Frozen  fish fillets  from  Poland  (reference price  - tariff quotas  -
special destination:  own  resources  DM  608  000  =  ~ ECU  300  000). 
Canned  tuna  from  Cote  d'Ivoire  (preferential  orgin  ACP;  own 
resources  ECU  17  million)  (cf.  1991  Annual  Report,  p.  23);  recovery 
in progress. 
Canned  'bonito'  from  Thailand  (false  description  of  products  in 
order  to  obtain  GSP  treatment;  own  resources  ECU  10  million)  (cf. 
1991  Annual  Report,  p.  23). 
32/90  Canned  tuna  from  Fiji/Solomon  Islands  (preferential  orgin  ACP;  own 
resources  ECU  2  million)  (cf.  1991  Annual  Report,  p.  23);  recovery 
of  ECU  700  000  (Solomon  Islands)  and  ECU  300  000  (Fiji;  after 
partial charging to unused exemptions). 
33/90·  Canned  tuna  from  Mauritius  (preferential origin  ACP;  own  resources 
ECU  6  million,  without  account  being  taken  of  an  exemption)  (cf. 
1992  Annual  Report,  p.  17). 
14/91  Skinned  prawns  from  Iceland  (preferential  origin:  bilateral 
agreement;  own  resources  ECU  3.5  million)  (cf.  1992  Annual  Report, 
p.  15)  recovery  in progress. 
15/91  Herring  fillets  from  Norway  (undervalued;  own  resources  DKR  70  180 
=  +  ECU  10  000) • 
59/91  Canned  tuna  from  Ecuador,  Colombia  (preferential  origin  GSP;  own 
resources  to  be  determined  but  probably  ~ ECU  6  million  for  each 
country). 
64/91  Canned  'bonito•  from  the  Philippines,  Indonesia  (false description 
of  product  in order to obtain GSP  treatment;  own  resources  ECU  4-5 
million  for  the  Philippines  - 2  500  irregular  form  A's  - less  for 
Indonesia- 600  irregular  form A's). 
10/92  Canned  tuna  from  the  Seychelles  (preferential  origin  ACP;  own 









Frozen  mackerel  fillets  from  Norway/USA  (origin:  not  clear;  own 
resources HFL  12  292  +  3  920 = 16  212  =·+ ECU  8  000). 
Cod  from  Norway  (false description of species + preferential origin 
bilateral  agreement)  (own  resources  ECU  1.3  million)  (cf.  1992 
Annual  Report,  p.  12). 
Canned  tuna  from  Thailand  refused 
(possibility of  rerouting  from  the  EC 
type was  reported by  Member  St~tes). 
by  USA  for  health  reasons 
- but  no  consignment  of  this 
Sardines  from  Morocco  (false  declaration  of  species 
quotas,  own  resources  ECU  3  935). 
tariff 
Prawns  and  lobsters  from  Madagascar  (preferential  origin  ACP,  own 
resources to be  determined). 
False  EUR.1' s,  Liberia,  octopus,  squid,  etc  (preferential  origin 
ACP,  own  resources to be determined). 
Avoidance  of  quotas  applicable  in  1993  to  canned  tuna  (false 
description of products). 
Frozen  hake  from  Argentina  (reference  price;  no  own  resources  at 
stake because  import  was  refused). 
I.( I 